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Quantum key distribution schemes which employ encoding on vacuum-one-photon qubits
are capable of transferring more information bits per particle than the standard schemes
employing polarization or phase coding. We calculate the maximum number of classical bits
per particle that can be securely transferred when the key distribution is performed with the
BB84 and B92 protocols, respectively, using the vacuum-one-photon qubits. In particular, we
show that for a generalized B92 protocol with the vacuum-one-photon qubits, a maximum
of two bits per particle can be securely transferred. We also demonstrate the advantage
brought about by performing a generalized measurement that is optimized for unambiguous
discrimination of the encoded states: the parameter range where the transfer of two bits
per particle can be achieved is dramatically enhanced as compared to the corresponding
parameter range of projective measurements.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD), as first suggested by Bennett and Brassard,1) provides
a way for two parties, known as Alice and Bob, to share a key with secrecy guaranteed by the
laws of quantum physics. Since its first demonstration in 1992,2) QKD has been extensively
studied both theoretically and experimentally to the point that it now represents probably
the most advanced application of quantum information processing.3) In most current QKD
implementations, information is encoded either in polarization or in phase of individual pho-
tons. The popularity of the polarization and phase codings stems from the fact that it is
relatively easy and straightforward to manipulate the polarization and phase of photons with
∗E-mail address: paper1224@kaist.ac.kr
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the already-existing optics technology.
Another possibility for the implementation of QKD protocols is “photon-number coding”
in which information is encoded on vacuum-one-photon qubits (VOPQs). By a VOPQ we mean
a qubit for which the two basis states are |0〉, the vacuum state, and |1〉, the one-photon state.
In contrast to the QKD schemes employing polarization or phase coding in which the signal is
carried by individual photons, QKD schemes with VOPQs utilize pulses in superpositions of
the vacuum and one-photon states as the signal carrier. QKD schemes with VOPQs suffer from
an obvious practical disadvantage that it is generally difficult to generate and detect such su-
perpositions. Nevertheless, recent theoretical and experimental progress in the generation and
detection of arbitrary superpositions of the vacuum and one-photon states using techniques of
linear optics4–10) and cavity QED,11–13) respectively, appears to open up avenues for quantum
information processing with VOPQs. In particular, quantum teleportation with VOPQs has
been studied theoretically14–18) and demonstrated experimentally.19, 20) QKD schemes based
on vacuum-one-photon entangled states (single-photon entangled state14, 21)) have also been
considered very recently.22, 23) Another practical disadvantage of QKD schemes with VOPQs
is that photon losses which are inevitable lead not just to reduced key rates but also to errors
caused by misidentification of the one-photon state with the vacuum state. This limits the
photon loss rate and consequently the distance over which the key can be distributed.
In this work we study the BB841) and B9224) QKD schemes using vacuum-one-photon
qubits, exploiting in particular the interesting property of the VOPQ, already noted earlier,8)
that it allows for low-energy-expense encoding of quantum information, as it requires, on
average, less than one photon for each qubit. The number of photons that Alice needs to
send to Bob in order to transfer a given amount of information can therefore be smaller with
VOPQs than with other qubit systems. This “cost effectiveness” of the QKD scheme employing
VOPQs is a practically important characteristic that makes it worthwhile to study.
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 introduces the parameters that quantify the
cost effectiveness of QKD schemes. In Sec. 3 we first discuss the cost effectiveness of the
BB84 protocol and then in detail that of the B92 protocol. We first deal with the case when
the encoding states are detected using standard quantum measurements (Projector Valued
Measurements, PVMs). The central result of the paper is that optimal cost effectiveness can be
realized in a much larger range of the parameters if an optimized generalized measurement (a
Positive Operator Valued Measurement, POVM) is employed for the detection of the encoding
states. In Sec. 4 and 5, respectively, we discuss effects of photon losses and of eavesdropping
attacks on QKD schemes using VOPQs. Finally, Sec. 6 presents discussion and summary of
our main findings.
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2. Effectiveness parameters
The problem of the cost effectiveness of a QKD scheme that we deal with here is closely
related to one of the most fundamental issues in information theory, namely, how efficiently
information can be transmitted from input to output of a communication channel. The clas-
sical theory due to Shannon25) states that the amount of information that can be transmitted
is limited by the Shannon entropy, a statistical measure of information per “letter” of input.
In quantum communication, which deals with quantum channels (quantum systems operating
as communication channels) transmitting signals that are prepared at the input in the form
of quantum states and measured at the output via quantum state measurements, it is the
von Neumann entropy that limits the amount of information transmitted.26, 27) Thus, when
information is carried by qubits, the maximum information per qubit that can be transmitted
is one bit, which is referred to as the Holevo limit.28, 29) The issue we address in this paper
has to do with the transmission efficiency of a QKD scheme, i.e., we study the question of
what are the maximum bits of information per qubit and per photon, repectively, that can
be securely transferred from Alice to Bob, while preventing an eavesdropper, Eve, from ac-
quiring information without being detected. A similar issue has recently been investigated by
Cabello.30)
For a quantitative discussion of the cost effectiveness of a QKD scheme, we first define the
“qubit effectiveness parameter” H as
H =
nb
nq
, (1)
where nq is the number of qubits sent from Alice to Bob, and nb represents the number of
classical information bits that are securely transferred from Alice to Bob. This parameter H,
which gives the ratio of the length of the sifted key to the length of the raw key, may be
considered to measure the degree of effectiveness with which a given QKD protocol produces
a secretly shared key per qubit sent. The Holevo limit establishes an upper bound to H, i.e.,
H ≤ 1 . (2)
Another parameter of interest that we wish to consider is the “particle effectiveness pa-
rameter” or the “cost effectiveness parameter” K defined as
K =
nb
np
, (3)
where np is the number of particles (photons) sent from Alice to Bob. In standard QKD
schemes employing polarization or phase coding, np and nq are the same and thus K = H.
When QKD schemes with VOPQs are considered, however, np ≤ nq and thus K ≥ H. We note
that the vacuum plays the role of a part of the signal in the QKD schemes with VOPQs, and
yet it does not cost to send vacuum. Thus, the parameter K can be regarded as a measure of
the cost effectiveness of the QKD scheme being employed. Since K is not limited by Holevo’s
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theorem, there is no reason why K cannot be greater than 1 when a QKD scheme with VOPQs
is employed. This suggests a possibility of transferring more than 1 bit of classical information
per photon sent, which is impossible with other QKD schemes.
3. Quantum key distribution with vacuum-one-photon qubits
In this section we calculate H and K for the two best known QKD protocols, BB841) and
B92,24) when VOPQs are used as well as when polarization qubits are used.
3.1 The BB84 protocol
For the standard BB84 protocol with polarization qubits, it is obvious that H = K = 12 ,
because Alice’s and Bob’s bases coincide half of the times. The only difference that arises
when we consider BB84 with VOPQs instead of the polarization qubits is that the four states
|0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) in which the signals are carried are to
be interpreted as the vacuum state, one-photon state, and the symmetric and antisymmetric
superpositions of the vacuum and one-photon states, respectively. Since the signal is chosen
randomly from the four states, the vacuum and one photon are represented equally on average,
and therefore np =
1
2nq. We thus obtain H =
1
2 andK = 1. The K value for BB84 with VOPQs
is twice that for BB84 with polarization qubits.
3.2 The B92 protocol
We next consider the B92 scheme. Let us first describe briefly the standard B92 protocol.
We assume polarization coding for convenience of discussion, although phase coding was
considered in the original proposal.24)
i. Detection based on projector valued measurements (PVMs, standard quantum measure-
ments). In the standard B92 scheme with polarization qubits, Alice sends a sequence of pho-
tons in a polarization state randomly chosen from |0〉 = | ↔〉 and |+〉 = 1√
2
(| ↔〉+ | l〉), and
Bob checks whether a signal is transmitted through his analyzer whose axis is oriented along
the direction randomly chosen from the directions of |1〉 = | l〉 and |−〉 = 1√
2
(| ↔〉 − | l〉).
Only when Bob detects a transmitted signal, which occurs with a probability 14 , can he de-
termine with certainty its polarization state. Thus, for this standard B92 scheme, we have
H = K = 14 .
The security of the B92 scheme rests on the fact that arbitrary two nonorthogonal states
cannot be distinguished perfectly. The two states that Alice chooses from do not need to
be |0〉 and |+〉; one can generalize the above B92 scheme to let Alice choose randomly from
two nonorthogonal states |ψ0〉 = cos θ0|0〉 + eiφ0 sin θ0|1〉 and |ψ1〉 = cos θ1|0〉 + eiφ1 sin θ1|1〉
(〈ψ0|ψ1〉 6= 0). Bob then performs his measurements choosing the axis randomly from the
directions of |ψ⊥0 〉 = sin θ0|0〉− e−iφ0 cos θ0|1〉 and |ψ⊥1 〉 = sin θ1|0〉− e−iφ1 cos θ1|1〉. The prob-
ability for Bob to obtain a conclusive measurement outcome then becomes 12(1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2).
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For the generalized B92 scheme, therefore, we obtain
H = K =
1
2
(1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2) , (4)
which reduces to H = K = 14 when |ψ0〉 = |0〉 and |ψ1〉 = |+〉, as expected.
The generalized B92 scheme can be adopted for VOPQs in a straightforward way. Here, of
course, the two states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 that Alice chooses from are superpositions of the vacuum
and one-photon states. Bob then needs to perform projection measurements by applying a
projection operator randomly chosen from P⊥0 = 1 − |ψ0〉〈ψ0| and P⊥1 = 1 − |ψ1〉〈ψ1|. As
before with the polarization qubits, H is given by H = 12(1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2). On the other hand,
the average number of photons contained in each qubit is less than one, and thus K is not
equal to H and is given by
K =
1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2
sin2 θ0 + sin
2 θ1
=
1− | cos θ0 cos θ1 + e−i(φ0−φ1) sin θ0 sin θ1|2
sin2 θ0 + sin
2 θ1
. (5)
It can be seen from Eq. (5) that, for given θ0 and θ1, K takes on its maximum value when
φ0 − φ1 = 0 if cos θ0 cos θ1 and sin θ0 sin θ1 are of opposite signs and when φ0 − φ1 = ±pi
if cos θ0 cos θ1 and sin θ0 sin θ1 are of the same sign. One can thus write K(θ0, θ1, φ0, φ1) ≤
Kmax(θ0, θ1) ≡ KPVMmax , where
KPVMmax =
1− (| cos θ0 cos θ1| − | sin θ0 sin θ1|)2
sin2 θ0 + sin
2 θ1
, (6)
and the superscript PVM refers to projector valued measurements. In Fig. 1 we plot KPVMmax
as a function of θ0 and θ1. K
PVM
max approaches its maximum value of 2 when both θ0 and θ1
approach 0.
KPVMmax takes a simple form if we consider the special case of θ0 = −θ1 ≡ θ and φ0 = φ1 = 0,
i.e., the case where |ψ0〉 = cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉 and |ψ1〉 = cos θ|0〉 − sin θ|1〉. A straightforward
calculation yields
K = Kmax(θ) = 2 cos
2 θ . (7)
Thus, along the line θ0 = ±θ1, K ≡ Kmax varies as 2 cos2 θ. For 0 ≤ |θ0| ≤ pi4 , the number
of bits transferred per photon is between 1 and 2, with the maximum value of 2 obtained for
θ0 = 0.
ii. Detection based on generalized measurements (Positive Operator Valued Measurements,
POVMs). To close this section we remark that Kmax = 2 can be reached in a larger region
of the parameters than the one given in Fig. 1. For this, one needs to perform a generalized
measurement (Positive Operator Valued Measure, POVM), instead of the projective von Neu-
mann measurement leading to Eq. (4). The POVM that one needs to perform is the one that
corresponds to optimal unambiguous state discrimination.31) Without going into details we
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Fig. 1. Contour plot of KPVMmax as a function of sin θ0 and sin θ1. The magnitude is represented by
brightness from the maximum value of 2 (white) to the minimum value of 0 (black).
just recall that the corresponding formulas for this case can be obtained if 12(1 − |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2)
in Eqs. (4) and (5) is replaced by (1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|). This, in turn, yields, in lieu of (6), KPOVMmax
as
KPOVMmax = 2
1− | | cos θ0 cos θ1| − | sin θ0 sin θ1| |
sin2 θ0 + sin
2 θ1
. (8)
In Fig. 2 we plot KPOVMmax as a function of θ0 and θ1. We see that K
POVM
max reaches its
maximum value of 2 for a much larger range of θ0 and θ1 than in Fig. 1.
A comparison of Figs. 1 and 2 reveals the advantage brought about by an optimized
measurement. While the optimal POVM does not increase the value of Kmax above 2, it will
increase the parameter range where the optimal value can be achieved.
For the special case of θ0 = −θ1 ≡ θ and φ0 = φ1 = 0, considered at the end on the
subsection on PVM detection, i.e., for the case where |ψ0〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 and |ψ1〉 =
cos θ|0〉 − sin θ|1〉, KPOVMmax = 2 along the line −pi4 ≤ θ0 = ±θ1 ≤ pi4 . Thus, the number of
bits transferred per photon is 2 for a large range of the parameters, using the optimized
measurement.
4. Effect of photon losses
Photon losses can be particularly damaging to QKD schemes using VOPQs, because they
induce errors caused by misidentification of the single photon state |1〉 with the vacuum |0〉.
In this section we study effects of the photon losses on our generalized B92 scheme using
VOPQs.
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Fig. 2. Contour plot of KPOV Mmax as a function of sin θ0 and sin θ1. The magnitude is represented by
brightness from the maximum value of 2 (white) to the minimum value of 0 (black). A comparison
to Fig. 1 reveals the advantage of a POVM: the parameter range where the maximum value of 2
can be achieved is enhanced.
The effect of the loss of a photon is represented by amplitude damping which transforms
the signal in state |ψj〉 = cos θj|0〉+ eiφj sin θj|1〉(j = 0, 1) into a mixed state described by the
density matrix
ρ′j =
(
cos2 θj + γ sin
2 θj
√
1− γe−iφj cos θj sin θj√
1− γeiφj cos θj sin θj (1− γ) sin2 θj
)
,
(9)
where γ is the probability of losing a photon. Considering only the photon losses during the
fiber transmission, we express γ as
γ = 1− 10−αl/10, (10)
where α is the loss coefficient of the fiber and l the length of the fiber.
With the possibility of photon losses, Alice and Bob now face the difficulty that the signal
transmission through Bob’s analyzer does not necessarily give the correct identification of the
signal state. In order to ensure that our scheme works properly, we require, as a minimum
condition, that the probability for correct identification be greater than the probability for
incorrect identification, i.e., we require
min{Tr(ρ′0P⊥1 ), T r(ρ′1P⊥0 )} > max{Tr(ρ′0P⊥0 ), T r(ρ′1P⊥1 )},
(11)
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where min and max, respectively, indicate that the smaller and greater of the two are to be
taken. Since the probability for incorrect identification increases with γ, the inequality (11)
sets the upper limit γmax on γ, which in turn sets the upper limit lmax on the key transfer
distance l.
In order to illustrate the effect of photon losses, we consider the case for which |ψ0〉 =
cos θ0|0〉 + sin θ0|1〉 and |ψ1〉 = cos θ1|0〉 − sin θ1|1〉, and compute γmax and lmax for a fixed
value of cos2 θ0 = 0.95 and different values of cos
2 θ1. For our calculation of lmax, we choose
α = 0.2dB/km, which is an appropriate value for fiber transmission at 1550nm. The result of
our calculation is shown in Figure 3. We see from Fig.3 that, as the value of cos2 θ1 is moved
away from cos2 θ0 = 0.95 toward a smaller value, γmax and lmax decrease and thus the amount
of photon losses that can be tolerated decreases. This can be understood by noting that, as
cos2 θ1 is decreased, the signal state |ψ1〉 moves toward the one-photon state and has therefore
more to lose when photon losses occur. In fact, one sees from Eq.(9) that photon losses increase
(decrease) the probability to find the signal in state |0〉 (|1〉) by γ sin2 θ. The smaller cos2 θ1
is, the greater the change in the signal state due to photon losses is, and thus the greater the
probability for incorrect identification of the state becomes. It is interesting to note, however,
that γmax decreases sufficiently slowly with respect to cos
2 θ1 that the tolerable amount of
photon losses remains high (γmax & 0.8), as long as cos
2 θ1 is reasonably close to cos
2 θ0. On
the other hand, the maximum key transfer distance decreases rapidly to less than ∼ 100km,
as cos2 θ1 is moved away from cos
2 θ0. We note, however, that, as cos
2 θ1 is moved away from
cos2 θ0, the probability
1
2(1−|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2) for Bob to obtain a conclusive measurement outcome
increases. We also remark that the photon loss probability γmax at which the probability for
correct identification of the signal state is equal to the probability for incorrect identification
takes on the same value regardless of whether Bob performs PVM or POVM. Hence, Fig.3
applies also to the case when POVM is performed.
The photon losses decrease the key rate and thus the parameters H and K by a factor of
(1 − γ). If γ is not too large, however, the parameter K can still be greater than 1 with our
scheme using VOPQs. In Fig.4 we plot γ0 at which K = 1 as a function of cos
2 θ1 for the
same case for which Fig.3 is drawn. If 0 ≤ γ < γ0, then K > 1 and thus more than one bit of
classical information per photon can still be transferred in the presence of photon losses. We
see again from Fig.4 the advantage brought about by POVM as compared with PVM.
5. Eavesdropping attacks
In this section we discuss effects of eavesdropping attacks on our key distribution scheme
using VOPQs. For concreteness of discussion we consider the intercept-resend attack in which
Eve intercepts all the signals from Alice and resends to Bob only those that give her the
conclusive measurement outcome. If Alice and Bob are to detect such eavesdropping attacks,
it must be required that the probability γ of losing a photon be less than the probability P?
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Fig. 3. γmax(solid curve) and lmax(dotted curve) as a function of cos
2 θ1. cos
2 θ0 = 0.95 and α =
0.2dB/km.
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that Eve’s measurement yields an inconclusive outcome, i.e., we have the requirement on γ
which reads
γ < P? (12)
Eq.(12) imposes another condition on γ in addition to the condition derived from Eq.(11).
Let us take, as an example, the case |ψ0〉 = cos θ|0〉+sin θ|1〉 and |ψ1〉 = cos θ|0〉− sin θ|1〉.
Assuming that Eve performs POVM on the signal from Alice, we have P? =
∣∣2 cos2 θ − 1∣∣ and
thus Eq.(12) becomes γ <
∣∣2 cos2 θ − 1∣∣. If θ is close to 0, that is, if |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are both close
to vacuum and thus there is a high probability for Eve to obtain the inconclusive measurement
outcome, then the requirement on γ is not so strong. As long as γ is not too large, Alice and
Bob can detect eavesdropping attacks, assuming that Eve blocks all the signals for which she
obtains the inconclusive measurement outcome. On the other hand, if θ is close to pi4 , i.e., if
|ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are almost orthogonal to each other and therefore there is only a low probability
for the inconclusive measurement outcome, then the requirement on γ is strong. Alice and
Bob are forced to use a low-loss system or are limited to relatively small distances for secure
key distribution.
If Alice and Bob find that signal losses are higher than those expected from system losses
γ, they suspect the presence of Eve and should discard all the data and restart. They keep
the data only when signal losses are within the limit allowed by system losses only. The
parameters H and K are therefore still limited by system losses, being reduced by a factor
of (1 − γ) compared with the values in an ideal situation, even if eavesdropping attacks are
considered. It should be mentioned, however, that, in our discussion so far, we have neglected
the reduction of the key length caused by the acts of information reconciliation and privacy
amplification that Alice and Bob need to perform to increase the accuracy and security of
their shared key. The actual values of H and K will therefore be further reduced. Considering
photon losses and effects of information reconciliation and privacy amplification, the cost
effectiveness parameter K cannot reach its ideal maximum value of 2. It can, however, be
still greater than 1, if photon losses are sufficiently small and information reconciliation and
privacy amplification are efficiently performed. It is possible to securely transfer more than 1
bit of classical information per photon sent using VOPQs.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
As described in the previous sections, QKD schemes with VOPQs have the potential of
transferring more than one bit of classical information per photon. When the B92 protocol is
considered, the number of bits transferred per photon has an upper bound of 2. The physical
reason for the existence of the upper bound on K can be understood as follows. One might
naively expect that K (number of bits transferred per particle sent) can be made arbitrarily
large simply by choosing the qubit states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 arbitrarily close to vacuum, i.e., by
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choosing θ0 and θ1 arbitrarily close to 0, thereby reducing the number of particles sent from
Alice to Bob. This expectation is, however, inaccurate because, as both θ0 and θ1 approach 0
together, the two states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 approach each other and it becomes increasingly difficult
to distinguish between them, reducing also the number of bits that can be transferred. The
maximum value of 2, however, is nontrivial, because it does not correspond to the case when
the average photon number per signal is 1/2.
The fact that K can be as large as 2 indicates that two bits of classical information can
be securely transferred by sending just one photon, if VOPQs are employed. In practice, of
course, the actual value of K should be lower than 2, because a part of the sifted key is
used for checking against eavesdropping and also for information reconciliation and privacy
amplification as described in Sec. 5.
It should be noted that, as θ0 and θ1 approach 0, the value of K increases, but at the
same time the probability for Bob to obtain a conclusive measurement outcome decreases,
which works to reduce the key rate. For example, when we consider the simple case in which
|ψ0〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 and |ψ1〉 = cos θ|0〉 − sin θ|1〉, the key rate is given by (r sin2 2θ)/2,
where r denotes the raw key rate, i.e., the number of qubits that Alice sends to Bob in
unit time. Obviously, the key rate approaches 0 as θ approaches 0. In practice, therefore, a
compromise should be made between the cost effectiveness which pushes θ toward 0 and the
key rate which pushes θ toward pi4 . Clearly, 2θ = pi/4 is a good compromise, in agreement with
the original suggestion in the B92 protocol,24) and still comfortably achieves Kmax = 2 if the
optimal POVM is employed for the detection of the coding states.
We mention that the efficiency of a QKD protocol has also been investigated recently by
Cabello.30) While we consider here the possibility of going beyond the Holevo limit, he studied
the efficiency of QKD protocols within the Holevo limit. He considered a parameter E defined
as the number of secret bits transferred per qubit per classical bit of information exchanged
between Alice and Bob through a classical channel. Since the classical communication between
Alice and Bob is generally necessary in a QKD protocol, we have E ≤ H. For example, we
have E = 14 while H =
1
2 for the standard BB84 protocol. Cabello has shown that it is possible
to design a protocol for which Bob’s state discrimination succeeds with 100% probability and
thus no classical communication is needed. In such a case, the parameter E is equal to H and
can take on its maximum value E = 1 in the Holevo limit.
Although QKD schemes with VOPQs have an advantage of being cost effective, they
suffer from a practical difficulty of having to deal with superpositions of the vacuum and
one-photon states. Another difficulty is with channel losses that are inevitably present. While
channel losses reduce the key rate in the usual QKD schemes employing polarization or phase
coding, they induce errors in QKD schemes with VOPQs. The requirement on channel losses
for a successful execution of the QKD schemes with VOPQs is more stringent than that with
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other types of qubits, as shown in Sec. 4.
In conclusion, we have shown that QKD schemes with VOPQs are capable of transferring
more than one bit of classical information per particle. When the B92 protocol is chosen, a
maximum of two bits per photon can be securely transferred in an ideal situation with the
use of vacuum-one-photon qubits. This maximal transfer rate can be reached in a large range
of parameters if the optimal unambiguous discrimantion strategy is used for the detection of
the coding states.
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